

EXECUTIVE SESSION

Witness: Admiral Arthur W. Radford,
former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Monday, June 6, 1960

United States Senate
Subcommittee on National
Policy Machinery of the
Government Operations
Committee
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:00 p.m., in Room 3302, New Senate Office Building, Senator Henry M. Jackson, chairman of the subcommittee, presiding.

Present: Senators Jackson, Muskie and Mundt.

Also Present: J. K. Mansfield, Staff Director; Dorothy Fosdick, Grenville Garside, Howard E. Haugerud, Brewster C. Denny and Richard Page, Professional Staff Members; Edmund E. Pendleton, Jr., Minority Counsel; Charles A. Haskins, Senior Staff Member, National Security Council; Robert Berry, representing Senator Karl E. Mundt; Theodore F. J. Crolius, Administrative Assistant to Senator Javits.

Senator Jackson. The subcommittee will come to order.

The Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery continues today its consideration of problems of policy-making at the highest level, with special reference to the National Security Council.

Our three-fold purpose continues to be to determine the adequacy of the national security policy-making apparatus, to assess the effectiveness of the means for coordination of policy implementation in the executive branch, and to make constructive recommendations for reform, where appropriate.

Our witness this afternoon has dedicated more than four decades of his life to the service of his country. His distinguished Naval career, spanning two World Wars, has been recognized by the award of the Distinguished Service Medal with gold star, and the Legion of Merit with gold star.

Admiral Radford served as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for four years before his retirement in 1957 to enter private business. In that capacity he had an opportunity to observe and participate in the workings of the National Security Council during a critical period. Therefore, we are particularly happy that he could join us today to discuss the subject of the Council and its operations, and such related problems as the coordination between the Departments of State and Defense.

Admiral Radford, we are delighted to have you with us.

STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL ARTHUR W. RADFORD

Admiral Radford. Is it my understanding, Senator, that in the case of anything being released, I can go over it?

Senator Jackson. Yes.

Admiral Radford. In other words, there won't be anything released unless I have had a chance to read it over?

Senator Jackson. There are three things. You have a chance to look over the record first, and if you want to take something out of this record, you may do so, on reflection. I think this is fair. We have done this with witnesses.

Two, anything relating to the NSC, the White House also has a right to pass on for release. We have worked this out amicably. So far we have not had any trouble, have we, Mr. Haskins?

Mr. Haskins. It has been very amicable, Senator.

Senator Jackson. So even if you are willing to have it if the White House makes a request, the Chair is certainly going out of his way to see that requests are honored.

Third would be the question of security. So we will have a three way check, you, the White House on NSC, and security.

Admiral Radford. That is fine.

Senator Jackson. I understand, Admiral, that you do not have a prepared statement. Would you prefer to respond to questions that we might ask?

Admiral Radford. That is correct, sir.

Senator Jackson. Suppose we start out on the NSC. I might ask this question:

What in your judgment are the most important prerequisites for the NSC as an advisory mechanism to the President? Should it be a small body, a large body? Should it confine itself to major problems, or should it get involved in many problems?

Admiral Radford. I would say that first the NSC is an instrument of the President's Office. Since it is an advisory body, I suppose to a certain extent its means or methods of operating are up to the President.

I personally think that it should continue to be as small as it could be to handle any particular question. There are, as you know, certain statutory members. There are others who are in attendance permanently; for example, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Then others are brought in for consideration of particular items on an agenda. But generally speaking, it is and should be kept as small as possible and still accomplish its purpose.

Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP91-00965R000300100022-3

The items to be discussed in the NSC should be important items. I think the agenda should be limited, and generally is, to important questions on which the President himself feels that he would like advice or counsel.

Senator Jackson. Shouldn't that be a kind of guiding principle? In other words, the NSC is advisory to the President.

Admiral Radford. I think a lot of people are inclined to forget that. It is advisory to the President, and I am sure that the President, in working with his Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, does control the agenda, and limit it to things he feels he would like more information on.

Senator Jackson. So on the two points, the size of the NSC should be limited and its agenda should be limited. This is sound from the standpoint of making the best possible use of the apparatus, would you say?

Admiral Radford. Yes. Incidentally I was in Washington and had considerable opportunity to study the proposals for the Unification Act before it was first enacted in 1947. I have always felt that the NSC was one of the best things that came out of that Act. I have watched the NSC under various conditions ever since 1947. I attended some meetings when I was here in the late Forties. Later I attended some meetings when I was Commander in Chief Pacific. Then I attended regularly for four years as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. So I have had an opportunity to observe it, and I think its operation has been pretty well handled and pretty well standardized ever since its creation in 1947.

Senator Mundt. Will you yield, Mr. Chairman?

Senator Jackson. Surely.

Senator Mundt. Admiral, don't you think it would be perfectly proper that while the agenda would be certainly fixed by the Commander in Chief, the President, it would be all right to have an understanding that anybody sitting there who might want to probe the minds of those who are associated with him on some problem he has, it should be understood that he has a right to throw out some question on which he might like counsel or on some suggestion he would like to make?

Admiral Radford. During the meeting?

Senator Mundt. Yes.

Admiral Radford. Yes. There has never been any restriction in that way.

Senator Mundt. While the agenda would be fixed by the President, anybody would feel free to toss out on the table some particular problem?

Admiral Radford. They do.

Senator Jackson. I think what the Admiral had in mind was that, with the President's responsibility covering so many different areas, he may desire to identify certain critical areas that the NSC should concentrate on so he can get the best possible advice on alternative policies and possible solutions that should be formulated.

Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP91-00965R000300100022-3

Admiral Radford. That is correct.

Senator Jackson. I agree with your comments on flexibility.

Senator Mundt. I did not want it to look as though it were frozen.

Senator Jackson. Some people have reflected the view that deliberations of the National Security Council actually do not have too much to do with the military defense posture, and these people take the view that in this area the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense and the President rather than the NSC play the vital role. Do you have any comments on that? Does the NSC, as an advisory body, play a substantial part in the formulation of important defense policies?

Admiral Radford. I would say that it does. Of course, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff attends every meeting, if he is in Washington. If he is not there, the next senior member of the Joint Chiefs attends and sits next to the Secretary of Defense. I remember that when I relieved General Bradley and reported as Chairman, the President told me never to hesitate to speak up, even though I was not a member, at any time in the course of the meeting on any subject that I thought was of importance. I did that. In other words, that was an independent action that I could take, without necessarily warning the Secretary of Defense in advance.

The National Security Council has an opportunity to become acquainted with all the defense policies, and I would say in the ordinary course of events it would have an opportunity to comment on important questions of policy.

Senator Jackson. Now, if I might turn to the budgetary process, some people feel that the NSC should be tied more closely with the budgetary process. They feel that policies proposed in NSC and within the budget work independently of each other. In other words, should the budget process enter into the picture at the time policies are being proposed to the President for his approval? Do you have any comment in that area?

Admiral Radford. I think generally speaking that is the case now. On the other hand, again it becomes a matter of the individual President and what he wants. He is the man who is responsible. If he wants to do it another way, I presume that is his prerogative.

Senator Jackson. Your recommendation is, of course, that inasmuch as the NSC is indeed an advisory instrumentality of the President, it should be conducted and should be set up in such a way and used as the President sees fit, with great flexibility.

Admiral Radford. I am sure the President will use it increasingly. It is an increasingly important adjunct of his office.

Senator Jackson. Do you have any comments on the operation of the Operations Coordinating Board, during the time you were Chairman of the Joint Chiefs? There has been some strong difference of opinion on whether it is doing its job or whether its usefulness can be improved upon. If you have any comments or suggestions we would appreciate it. All of this, as we told you, is an attempt to be constructive.

-5-

Admiral Radford. The OCB is a vital adjunct of the NSC. It is supposed to police the implementation of policy, to see that the policies established are being carried out and report back to the NSC any problems in connection therewith.

My feeling is that the OCB, or the membership of the OCB consists of men who have important jobs. The only comment I would have is that I don't believe that they can always afford to give it the time that it should have. I have wondered if the OCB should not have one or two very competent men on an almost a full time basis. On the other hand, the advantage of the present membership is that it is drawn from State, Defense, CIA, USIA, ICA, and I forget just who the others are. In other words, they are drawn from offices who have an interest and jurisdiction. Maybe the Chairman of the OCB should be an independent individual, full time. But I do know, for instance, that the Deputy Secretary of Defense who is a member of the OCB had great difficulty in finding time to attend these meetings. I am sure the Under Secretary of State did, too.

I think the big question which you should ask some of the members of the OCB is whether they feel they can devote enough time to do the job.

Senator Jackson. In this same connection, wouldn't it be helpful if they could monitor the implementation of the key or critical policy decisions?

Admiral Radford. I think that is what they try to do. However they are necessarily in the hands of their staff to a large extent, because they are very busy men, all of them.

Senator Jackson. Your thought is that some permanent follow-through, or permanent watch dog might be a constructive way of handling it.

Admiral Radford. Maybe one member. Maybe the Chairman of the OCB might be a very capable man with no other job.

Senator Jackson. I personally feel that this idea is sound. We all know that in a governmental setup such as ours, and the size of ours, you can decide on a policy -- even the President can -- but it can get chopped to pieces on the way down through the various levels of bureaucracy. This is a problem common to all Presidents.

Admiral Radford. That is right.

Senator Jackson. I am not referring to any one administration. I am sure you have seen evidence of this kind of situation. I think Gordon Gray is the Chairman now of OCB.

Senator Mundt. Yes. I just noticed that in this report.

Senator Jackson. He has other responsibilities and other duties because he is the Special Assistant to the President for Security Affairs. He has responsibilities in the whole area of national security as the advisor to the President in the White House.

-6-

We have had some testimony from several witnesses on the tremendous number of inter- and intra-departmental committees involved in the decision making process. This again is a part of the system that has existed for many, many years. I say it applies to all administrations. I just wonder if you have any comments on this committee system. We have had a lot of adverse testimony regarding committees, and criticisms that as instruments of government they do not seem to be too effective. It appears that there is a tendency to use committees to defer action on a problem. Some of our witnesses have made the distinction between committees in which the chairmen can make decisions, and other committees in which no one can make decisions and a lot of time is wasted.

Dr. York pointed out that he had two or three committees which he chaired and he was able to make decisions. Other witnesses have pointed out that they have a problem and that it has been a part of our difficulty in the Executive Branch over many years.

I wonder if you have any comments you might want to make, Admiral.

Admiral Radford. It has always been interesting to me to hear people say that we should not have as many committees as we have, or we should get along without committees, but I have never heard of any really good suggestion as to how we would function in our government without committees or the committee structure. As far as I know, every government with which I have had anything to do or any acquaintanceship has had committees. Big corporations in the United States have to have committees. It is a device to keep various parts of the organization acquainted with what is going on in the other part. Not all committees are set up for the purpose of making decisions. When you talk about 900 committees in the Pentagon, probably 850 don't meet very often and are more in the area of keeping various offices informed of what is going on in other offices. The really important committees that function quite often and have to make recommendations to higher authority -- in other words, have to come to some kind of agreement -- are rather limited in number. I know of no other machinery that we could devise that could do what the committees do.

I have never seen any expert on organization that had anything to offer to take their place. I think that they are a necessary part of our government's structure. For the most part, if the committee is not functioning well, it probably is the fault of the Chairman, or there may be one difficult member who causes trouble. The Chairman of a committee in my opinion today in Washington can either get on with his job and get the work done, or he can stall around and have a lot of trouble, one of the two. I think good chairmen get good results out of committees. I think we should continue to have them.

Senator Jackson. Would you say that it would be helpful, however, in setting up committees to empower the chairmen to make decisions, after full discussion? People have said you should take a vote and so on like you do up on the Hill, but there is a distinction. The Executive Branch is not a legislative body and people who do run the Executive Branch have a responsibility to make decisions.

-7-

Admiral Radford. I would hesitate to say that the committee chairman or somebody has to make a decision because all of these committees, or practically all that I can think of offhand, are advisory to someone in the higher echelon, who wants information from this group of men. He wants to know if there are differences of opinion. In other words, he would like to know if the majority favor one line of action, with a healthy minority another line. Or he wants to know if there is only one man opposing the whole group. As a rule the decision has to be made by an officer or someone in the organization who is advised by this committee.

Senator Jackson. I didn't mean a decision in that sense, because the committees are usually at a lower level. What I had in mind was someone to give an advisory recommendation so that the man who must make the decision ultimately would have a clear recommendation.

Admiral Radford. I don't know of any instance where a good chairman of a committee cannot produce a recommendation when it is needed, if he is on the job, even though the committee is split.

Senator Jackson. Now, I wonder if I might turn to the problem of coordination between State and Defense. Do you think that it might be worthwhile to give some thought at least to establishing what we might call a joint career service, or a senior staff corps, composed of a small and carefully selected number of military officers and senior civilians in State and Defense and related national security agencies? The thought behind this is that in the interest of broadening their experience, these people would serve tours of duty in a number of departments and agencies. They would be given special opportunity for advanced training. One might start such a staff corps on a trial basis. We have had some fine military officers who have performed great service to the country in the Department of State for example, General Bonesteel.

Admiral Radford. I know him.

Senator Jackson. And others, because of fine training and good heads have rendered outstanding service. As we all realize, the problem of national security is so tied in with foreign policy. There is no sharp line of demarcation between the two and the need to know between the two departments is getting more and more important as time goes on. Do you think we could improve upon the process in this area?

Admiral Radford. It is not clear to me exactly where this select group would work.

Senator Jackson. For instance, what I had in mind was this. Let us talk about the Defense Department first. We have three or four outstanding staff men in the military service who have demonstrated that they would be eminently qualified to assist, we will say, the policy planning staff in the State Department. You might want to send one of them to serve there. But for many reasons you might not want to have a military officer in uniform over in the State Department serving in that capacity. You would select a certain number of these officers to serve not only the policy planning staff, but in some other department, and some people from State could go over to the Joint Staff to assist over there. They would be known as part of a senior officer corps with special status. The military officers would no longer be

subject to regular tours of duty out in the field. Their military pay and retirement rights would be protected, and we could give them additional compensation.

Admiral Radford. I would say, first, I have always been generally afraid of these career specialists groups. My limited experience with people in that category has been that they are liable to become too parochial in their outlook. They stay too long in one place. There have been suggestions, for instance, that the Joint Staff in the Pentagon be composed of officers who have been selected from the various services and made into a permanent Joint Staff, instead of having rotation from the various services.

I would much prefer to have the present system where the officers rotate. You get a fresh point of view. The great danger with a career organization, as I would see it, would be that they would lose touch with anything but their specialist work. They would not have the broadening influence of going away and coming back. In my opinion, if you asked one of these bright planning officers if he would like to become one of the elite group and stay here in Washington, he would say no, especially if he wanted some day to be the Chief of Staff of his service or Chief of Naval Operations. Should you talk to outstanding young Foreign Service Officers, you would probably get the same answer. They would much rather become ambassadors and go on up in the Foreign Service than stay in Washington. You would have a hard time offering them a more interesting career and more compensation.

Senator Jackson. My thought was that you might make it so attractive that they would want to follow this new career. I certainly agree with you, that if they wanted to be in a command position at the top, they would have to stay in the regular military service.

Admiral Radford. I wonder if you could make it more attractive. I would be afraid that an organization of that kind would become too limited in its outlook.

Senator Jackson. Of course, I do not assume they would be tied down to a specific Washington assignment for good. But maybe some better use could be made of a limited number of individuals who have demonstrated unique qualifications. Some of them could even become ambassadors. They would lose their military status, but they would be in a well recognized and honored corps where they could further serve the country.

I am sure you have been impressed as I have in going down to the War College and talking with students. I think in many respects some of the students are as well or better informed than some of our Foreign Service people in the area of diplomacy.

Admiral Radford. Of course, we have Foreign Service students down there, you know.

Senator Jackson. Yes, a limited number.

Admiral Radford. I have been serving on the Board of Consultants at the National War College. I would favor increasing the number myself.

Senator Jackson. The number of Foreign Service students at the War College? Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP91-00965R000300100022-3

Admiral Radford. Yes.

Senator Jackson. I am glad to hear you say that.

Admiral Radford. In the first place, I could say that in my opinion we have quite a few military officers and Foreign Service Officers who are qualified in the field of foreign policy and national security affairs; Bonesteel is an example, and I could pick out 15 or 20 individuals who are, I think, of that caliber.

Senator Jackson. I only mentioned him as an example.

Admiral Radford. Yes. I think we are fortunate, really, and this is not accidental. The National War College has been doing a pretty good job of turning out people that are going to grow into these experts. I would say that as of right now, today, the United States is pretty well fixed, and we will be even better off if we continue to handle the problem as well as we have.

Senator Jackson. Along the same line, what about an exchange of persons between the Departments of Defense and State, for limited periods? We have had some of that from time to time. Do you feel that this should be encouraged?

Admiral Radford. There is nothing that prevents it now. I might say that there are military officers serving in a number of departments around Washington, not just in the Defense Department. But the great problem, if you are a young officer on your way up, and somebody says, "We want you to serve on the State Department policy planning," you don't want to at all. Your career is in the military. You don't want to have some State Department officer filling out your fitness report for a couple of years. You would be afraid that it might jeopardize your position in the Defense Department.

Senator Jackson. Don't you feel that there needs to be more and more training in international political problems on the part of staff officers who are working on military plans? I realize the things you refer to have been going on in the past, but there is a change going on. Don't you think that the military should meet it?

Admiral Radford. I think we are meeting it. All the service War Colleges, the National War Colleges and the Armed Forces Staff School are concentrating on training our military officers in the broad field of politico-military affairs. They are doing an excellent job.

Senator Jackson. They take the course at the colleges. But what I am asking is whether you think it would be helpful if they actually got into the departmental operations for two or three years or whatever the case may be.

Admiral Radford. The State Department has their part of the job to do and the Defense Department has their part of the job to do. There is good liaison between the two groups. I for the life of me cannot see any reason for the State Department to have a military officer over there. They can get advice any time they want. I used to go over and give briefings to the top people in the State Department from the Secretary on down. They could ask me any questions they wanted to. I would have been glad to send anybody over there for a temporary assignment if they wanted to get some further information.

Senator Jackson. For example, I am suggesting possible temporary service in the State Department of an outstanding military officer who has demonstrated he is not only a good military planner, but that he understands the meshing of military planning with foreign policy. This understanding may become critical in certain areas in deciding what we want to do in providing military aid to a country, or what we might do in a limited war.

Admiral Radford. They set up these ad hoc committees to do exactly that. You will find that joint State-Defense Committees are set up from time to time to study a particular problem which may go on for four or five months.

Senator Jackson. I have other questions, but in view of the time I will call on Senator Mundt.

Senator Mundt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral, it is good to have you here. I have two types of questions. One is dealing with this National Security Council, and the other one I would like to probe the mind a little bit about the general defense picture.

Do you think that the Executive Branch has an adequate long range planning policy for the cold war? Are we looking far enough down the road and setting up a plan of the way we would like to have things eventuate if everything comes out according to our blueprints? Is that part of the work of the National Security Council or is it part of the work which is being handled some place in government? I have a feeling that the Communists look a long way down the road. Incidents come along that tend to change their tactics, but their ultimate objective remains pretty fixed and pretty constant.

I wonder if in this cold war on the free side of the world we do that job with equal decisiveness?

Admiral Radford. Senator, in the military we have long range planning. We have tried to visualize where we are going, and where we want to go for some considerable years in the future. The State Department has a less tangible area to work with there. I think the Executive Branch of the government does try to forecast where we are going and where we would like to go, but we are not like the Communist government. The Communist government has a firmly fixed objective, and that objective is to dominate the rest of the world by hook or crook. Our objective is to live in peace and to be let alone. Having that attitude, which I think represents the attitude of the American people, we are probably going to be caught off guard in many instances, because we cannot always make firm plans ahead.

One of the reasons is that because of the appropriation cycle and other factors, all of our plans are subject to a large extent, to a year to year review by the Congress. The United States under our form of government is not able, in my opinion, to do what the Communists can do in connection with long range planning.

Senator Mundt. We can't do it certainly by the direct action process that they employ, by gobbling up a free country or creating an incident in Berlin or stimulating some activity in Asia by Mao tse-Tung. But I think the President has stated it quite clearly, peace with justice. After all,

Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP91-00965R000300100022-3

that is all we want in America, world peace with a maximum degree of justice for people everywhere. I am wondering whether in our long scale planning we map out our foreign military installations and foreign policies and our economic aid program, and all the rest, so that we can sort of envision where we will be in 1962, 1965 and 1970, in achieving this objective of peace with justice, provided things go according to the plans we set up.

Admiral Radford. We do try to do that. I was a member of the Draper Committee which studied the Mutual Security Program a year and a half ago. One of the recommendations of that committee was that the Mutual Security Program be put as a minimum on a three year basis. In my experience as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and traveling around the world, I found that it was most inefficient to have to work on an annual basis in this military aid program. It makes it very difficult for our allies. They have to plan. They have their own budgetary problems. They need to know two or three years in advance what we were going to do so they can fit it into their plans. This is absolutely essential in order to achieve maximum efficiency in planning. I know that the Defense Department tries very hard to plan ahead. As a matter of fact, in the Defense Department budgetary process, we are actually planning about three years in advance, sometimes four. For example, some of the longest lead time items for which we are asking money for this year won't be delivered for four years. But they are in the budget.

At any given period of time it is very difficult to change the direction in which you are going. If, in any given year, you wanted to change our policy objective radically you would have a hard time finding all the areas where it would be necessary to stop and start off in another direction. In other words, we are working, I would say, at least three years and very often five years ahead toward an objective of one kind or another.

In the foreign policy field, that objective cannot be quite as firm and the planning cannot be quite as hard and fast as it can be in the more tangible military field, but I think we are learning a lot more about it and are constantly doing better.

Senator Mundt. Is the formulation of policies of that type and long term goals something that is part of the function of the NSC?

Admiral Radford. The NSC monitors the departmental studies and pulls them all together in that field, yes.

Senator Mundt. Admiral, do you think we have gone as far as we can or as far as we should in the unification of the Armed Forces? Since the Chairman and I have been in Congress, we have passed this unification law, and everybody had high hopes of great economies, great standardizations and great procurement efficiencies. Do you think we have moved as far and as fast in that direction as possible?

Admiral Radford. Senator, I would say that we have made enormous improvements in the overall military picture. I would say that it is probably true that if we had not taken the steps we did in 1947, the events of the last decade would have caught us very badly off guard. I think that we have room for further improvements and some of them are being made. I testified almost two years ago on the last reorganization act, which I thought was a step forward. I still think that we may have to take some more steps. But my own feeling is that the military organization is better than it has ever been in the past.

Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP91-00965R000300100022-3

Senator Mundt. We hear criticisms and read them sometimes, and I don't know how well founded they are, that the chiefs of the services are somewhat hampered in having direct access to the respective Secretaries. Do you think that is a valid statement?

Admiral Radford. I think that is absolutely untrue. I do think that the chiefs of services have access -- and as far as I know they always have had -- to any Secretary that they want to see, and to the President. Of course, they can't overdo requests of that kind. If they have a good legitimate reason to see anybody above them, they can do it. The one area I am not satisfied with is this: I am not convinced that the Joint Chiefs of Staff can continue to be composed of the service chiefs. I think it is a little bit too much to ask of a man to take off his service hat and come in that room and I don't think he does.

Senator Mundt. Have you any suggestions to make in connection with the problem of recruitment of executives in the Department of Defense? We always hear it said it would be better if we could get the top men of the country to devote themselves for a long period of time to these problems. But you never really achieve that goal. Have you any suggestions to make on how we might get the best people, the best brains, wherever they are available, in this all important job?

Admiral Radford. Senator Mundt, I think that is one of the most serious questions we have to face in government today. Our government is set up to operate with non-career civilians running the various departments. In other words, you read under the unification act that the military services are supposed to be under civilian control and that civilian control comes in from civilian life. However, most of them don't stay there long enough to exercise effective control.

Senator Jackson. They have not completed their briefing yet.

Admiral Radford. No. In these civilian jobs they should stay, I would say, a minimum of three years to really be effective and make it worthwhile.

Senator Jackson. I think President Eisenhower in his speech at Notre Dame last night recommended four years.

Admiral Radford. I would also recommend four.

Senator Jackson. Excuse me. I did not mean to interrupt.

Admiral Radford. I would say four would be better. The conflict of interest laws often prevent the right caliber of man from coming into government service at the right age level. I would say that there are many men between 40 and 55, the prime of life, for doers, who will not consider coming down here because of the conflict of interest laws. Some of them come down and can't get confirmed when they find out what the rules are.

Senator Jackson. I made a speech on that problem ten days ago.

Senator Mundt. Did you have an answer?

Senator Jackson. It is in line with the testimony before this committee. I think the cold, hard truth is, Admiral, that we get these people in time of war. Yet the need for these people is just as urgent today as in time of hot war, because we are, in fact, in a war. I pointed out in my remarks to the recent meeting of the National Executive Reserve, that the conflict of interest statutes are archaic. On this point we recently had most helpful testimony from Mr. Greenewalt of du Pont and Mr. Bochenstein of Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corporation, Professor Bayless Manning of the Yale Law School who is an outstanding authority on conflict of interest, and Mr. John Corson, who is very able in this field. For example, one ludicrous situation involves the man in a New York law firm who was asked by the President to come down and serve on the Fine Arts Commission, and he could not accept because his law firm would have to give up all its antitrust and internal revenue litigation.

These statutes were passed years and years ago, and need to be revised.

Then there are a lot of other problems, including the preservation of certain stock ownership rights, and pension rights. Young executives are reluctant to come down here right in their prime. Yet they are the very ones we need.

Senator Mundt. You can't get them now until they have made it financially to the point that they can afford to retire, which means 90 per cent of the time they are going on up in the age brackets.

Senator Jackson. When we are in a hot war, we do not have any hesitancy in doing what is necessary to get the people we need. Just because the cold war is not always so dramatic in spelling out the danger, we do not take the necessary steps. Here is what the President said at Notre Dame. Suppose we have the President's statement included in the record, if there is no objection.¹

Let me just quote this point from the President's address:

"This does not mean that you need become permanently implanted in government. Quite the contrary. In policy-forming positions we constantly need expert knowledge and fresh points of view. Some frequency of withdrawal and return to private life would help eliminate the dangerous concept that permanence in office is more important than the rightness of decision. Contrary-wise, such a tour should not be so brief as to minimize the value of the contribution and diminish the quality of public service. Normally, a four-year period in these policy posts would seem to be a minimum. Most leaders from private life who enter the public service do so at a substantial sacrifice in the earning power of their productive years."

This is very much along the line of the speech I made a couple of weeks ago.

1. The full text of the President's speech at Notre Dame on June 5 will be included in the permanent hearing record.

Senator Mundt. I am perfectly willing to have that speech go in the record, too. I think it might be a good contribution. I really do. You might hesitate to ask it, but if you think it is pertinent, I ask unanimous consent that it appear in the record.

Senator Jackson. Thank you, Senator, We will do that.² I want the committee to seriously consider a draft resolution which I think would be helpful to the next President whoever he is. In this resolution the Senate would express its opinion that people who come down here are expected to serve a reasonable period of time. While we all realize that we should make the climate as good as possible, I think it would help the next President if he could tell his prospective appointees that they will be expected to stay a reasonable period and that the Senate has expressed its opinion, exercising as it does the Constitutional power of giving its advice and consent. I have a rough draft that I will submit later.

Senator Jackson. Will you excuse us, Admiral? We have a roll call.

(A brief recess was taken during which the meeting was moved to Room 3110, New Senate Office Building.)

Senator Jackson. We are sorry about the delay, Admiral. Senator Mundt.

Senator Mundt. Admiral, in view of the probable duration of the cold war, do you feel, one, that our defense program is adequate, and two, that the United States is strong enough to defend itself against this Russian or Communist threat?

Admiral Radford. I would say, Senator Mundt, that as of today we have the most powerful military force in the world, and the only reason that the free world has the peace that it has is because of our military strength today. Our military programs are constantly being reviewed, and I presume that will continue, and that we will maintain a powerful force. I think the Russians respect our military strength.

Senator Mundt. Do you think that the rest of the free world has been adequately apprised of our strength, and that they recognize the fact that we are as strong as we are? Do they tend to downgrade us, perhaps?

Admiral Radford. I think that the leaders in the rest of the free world do understand this. In many instances, for their domestic political reasons they won't say so or say so publicly. But I think that in our country, our own press sometimes inadvertently creates doubts in their minds and the minds of the people of the free world. When you travel around the world, as I did when I was Chairman, two or three times as well as on other occasions, you see these columns with a Washington date line critical of the programs here and downgrading our efforts. They are usually milled out and reprinted in full around the world, whereas other official statements usually get very little treatment. I would say at present we are very apt to downgrade ourselves around the world, thereby giving an incorrect image which the Communists can and do exploit.

2. The full text of Senator Jackson's speech on May 23 before the second National Training Conference of the National Defense Executive Reserve will be included in the permanent hearing record.

Senator Mundt. It might be a job for the Voice of America to undertake. It is a little hard; we don't like to brag.

Admiral Radford. It is a little hard for them to do it. The international press is the best means of reaching the people.

Senator Mundt. As a part of our overseas information program, we bring in at different times leaders from abroad, journalists from abroad. Maybe we should accentuate that and let them kind of come here and get the feel of things.

Admiral Radford. I would say it is something on which we ought constantly to try to do a better job.

Senator Mundt. Let me ask you a corollary. How about the American public? Do you think they are adequately informed concerning our military capacity?

Admiral Radford. I gather from my last three years of contact with the public since I retired that many of our American citizens also are somewhat puzzled by the great controversies that go on in this field. They are not sure what is right and what is wrong.

Senator Mundt. We have a problem, don't we, Admiral? We want them to have a sense of security without developing a sense of complacency so that they are not bombarding Congress and saying we are spending too much.

Admiral Radford. That is right. This whole problem is a very difficult one, because we have never before in the history of this country, in the history of the world, had such rapid technological progress. What is good today may be completely outmoded virtually overnight. So I think the American public has to be told - and you can't do it too often - that number one, this country still faces a great threat from a determined and unscrupulous enemy. For the indefinite future, a very large proportion of our resources is going to have to be allocated to our security. We are going to have to help the rest of the free world maintain adequate defenses. If we did not and if they succumbed to the Communist offensive, we would be weakened with every further one that goes behind the Iron Curtain. I think this is a continuing job that has to be done with the American public.

Senator Mundt. You have watched this for a long time and participated in it for a great number of years. In your opinion at the present time vis a vis Russia, do we have a space gap or a missile gap or a defense gap or some kind of gap that we should be plugging up?

Admiral Radford. Senator, I am not up to date on the details of our defense program, and I make no effort to try to remain so any more. In the first place, it is almost a full time job. In the second place, we have very able men running it. If they needed my help, I am sure they would come and ask me. I think myself that we have a very sound program. From what I know I do not feel that we have any great missile gap. However, I must admit that I am not acquainted with all the details.

Senator Mundt. From your experience, is it imperative that our country keep even with or ahead of the Soviet Union in every category of defense, or is this something that we should try to evaluate on balance rather than to try to say that in every area of activity we have to be superior?

Admiral Radford. I think we have to be ahead in those areas that are critical from a military or security point of view. We either have to be ahead or we have to be so close to what they can do that they won't think they can attack us without being destroyed themselves. I think that generally speaking that is what we have managed to do. Of course, you must remember the Communist dictatorship, such as Russia has, is able quickly to concentrate talent in any particular line of research or effort. They can order their people to go and work at a place and to stay there until they have accomplished the desired result. They have the advantage of having practically everything available to them that we develop over here. At least a great many of the developments that take place in the free world, and particularly in the United States, are available to them either directly through our trade magazines, or through other sources which are not too difficult. So they can get a great deal of their technological development for nothing. They don't belong to the International Patent Pool or Patent Agreement. If they get hold of a device they don't mind copying it and using it. So they can take the talent that we have to spread over many areas, and can concentrate their own as desired after getting a free ride from us and others.

It is unfair but it is a pretty difficult situation to control.

Senator Mundt. There is one place where they can't emulate us, and they can't follow our techniques. I am wondering how big an importance you attach to that phase of our defense establishment which they cannot imitate, and that is the forward bases, this advanced power that we have located in a peripheral circle around Russia? That is something that they have not been able to do by stealing patents or by anything else, because they just don't have the terrain, and they don't have friendly governments close to us on which they can establish their bases. We have that, Turkey and all these other places. Is that a pretty important part of our defense posture?

Admiral Radford. It is something that people very often forget, Senator Mundt. We have tremendous advantages of geography in the military picture. It is one of the great assets of the free world. We surround the Soviet bloc. We have the forward bases. We control the oceans of the world pretty well, and can maintain these forward bases. Nobody realizes better the difficulties of their position than the Russian military planners.

Senator Mundt. Reversing the position, we would feel quite uneasy if they had that advantage.

Admiral Radford. That is right.

Senator Jackson. Senator Muskie.

Senator Muskie. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I would like to go back to the National Security Council. As a layman and almost totally unschooled in this field, it seems to me that our security policy machinery must and probably does meet certain standards that seem rather obvious to me. In the first place, it would seem to me that it

of all factors and forces bearing upon our national security and of the resources that we have mobilized to bring it into play in the field. It seems to me secondary, that it ought to be almost instantaneously sensitive to any changes in circumstances bearing upon our security. It ought to be responsive or readily responsive to such changes. Finally it ought to be creative in developing whatever new approaches may be needed to respond to these changes. This is at least the understanding of our security policy machinery which I have gained through the course of these hearings.

I am going to refer to something here and do it in what I hope will be understood as a nonpartisan way, simply to get an answer. President Eisenhower, in the summer of 1952, said that the National Security Council, as presently constituted, is more a shadow agency than a really effective policy maker.

If this was an accurate statement at the time, then the National Security Council at that time certainly did not meet the tests which I have suggested here. I would like, then, from you, if you feel free to give it, your own evaluation as to the accuracy of this picture in 1952, the picture today, and if it has improved, what has contributed to the improvement.

Admiral Radford. I am a little mixed up to this extent, Senator. The national security machinery is not all in the National Security Council.

Senator Muskie. I should have qualified my question to that extent. I suppose I should ask you first your reaction to my standards here as they relate to the National Security Council and the part that it plays in this picture.

Admiral Radford. I would say that in the Executive Branch of government those requirements that you outline are generally met. At least that is certainly the aim. In the Defense Department we watch the day to day military and political picture as well as we can; or more accurately the intelligence community with representation from all the important government agencies takes care of watching the day to day picture and keeps the responsible officials informed.

The Defense Department is set up to follow events and be prepared to take any necessary action in a hurry. The National Security Council is an organization designed primarily to advise the President. He can beef it up or he can reduce it in accordance with his own methods of doing business in order to respond to his individual needs. I don't know exactly what President Eisenhower had in mind when he made the statement to which you referred. However, I presume that in 1952 the National Security Council satisfied President Truman. I remember attending meetings of the National Security Council about that time. Its staff was probably smaller. However, all of these agencies have grown tremendously as the problems have grown. In 1952, we were fighting in Korea, but we had a sort of lull in this country from 1945 to 1950. We had not quite made up our minds that the Communists were really going to try to get us. Then we had this setback in Korea. Since that time we have developed the concept of being ready for the long pull and being ready day to day. We have become educated more and more to the point where we realize that we have an intractable, unrelenting, unscrupulous group that is just waiting for the day when we become weak enough to be jumped on. So our national security machinery has to be ready all the time now, and it has to be ready in its entirety.

-18-

Senator Muskie. What I am trying to convey here is that in my own judgment, and I think in the understanding of most American citizens, when we are confronted with whatever posture the Soviet Union assumes, and with any change in that posture, we like to think that we have some mechanism or some means for immediately accommodating our own security requirements to this situation. I am trying to avoid saying that we are trigger happy, or that there is a finger on the trigger. We have to be a nimble fighter in order to survive. We on this committee have been exploring the role that the National Security Council plays in this. Can it play this kind of a role, or is it, as you have stated, bound to be simply an advisory council? Is this role necessarily one that must be played by the President alone? We know he has the Constitutional authority which he cannot strip himself of. Is he the only one that can do this job that I am trying to portray here?

Admiral Radford. I would say, Number 1, he has this enormous responsibility, and most of it he cannot escape. He can get help and he does. He has the Secretary of State who keeps him up to date and advises him of the current world situation in his area of responsibility. He has the Secretary of Defense who keeps him posted in the military area. These two principal assistants keep him advised. The National Security Council really does not come into this part of the picture, in my opinion. If I get what you are concerned about, our readiness to react, and our organization for keeping aware of changes, that part of the job is not done, in my opinion, in the National Security Council.

On the other hand, the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs has constant contacts with these outside agencies and with the Central Intelligence Agency. He very often may be the one who keeps the President currently advised and not the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State. In that way he assists them in their work. I would say if we go back to 1945 at the end of the war, when we dismantled our tremendous military machine, certainly there was a feeling here in Washington that we had done a very good job in the war. We had really destroyed our two major enemies and thought we could look forward to a sort of new period of development in the world at large. We gradually became aware that the Soviets had not been an honest ally at any stage of the game. I think it was hard for some people to believe that they were quite as bad as they turned out to be.

I know that it was in 1947 or 1948 that Mr. Forrestal became convinced that we had to really build up our military forces in a major way. He was convinced that the Communist threat was developing very rapidly and that they were not men of good will or allies in any sense of the word. We actually did not take steps to meet the military threat until the invasion of Korea. By that time our military forces were quite weak. Then we appropriated tremendous amounts of money. Since that time we have been trying to reach and maintain a level posture sufficiently strong to impress the Russians with the fact that they had better not start anything else.

We reached that stage some time around 1954, and that we have maintained it since then. I think we are going to maintain it with a gradually increasing military budget. The gradual increase comes from the greater cost of new weapons and the general increase in costs that go with a large organization, and the reluctance, which is sometimes justified, and I don't want to intimate that it is not -- to do away with something that is old as you get something new. In other words, the services are sometimes unwilling to eliminate something

Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP91-00965R000300100022-3

old for everything new that they get. One of the constant problems that the Secretary of Defense has is to convince the services that there is something that they can drop out.

Then the cost of some of the new research and development programs are simply staggering. We are in areas of such magnitude of expenditures that it is hard to believe and almost frightening when the people who know what these programs cost make the estimates.

I would say that as of today, and I hope for the indefinite future, we have impressed the Soviet military men with our strength. They are the ones who have to continue to be impressed.

Senator Muskie. We have been told that we were misled, at least, by the Russian bomber program or its apparent weakness five or six years ago, and that we did not appreciate what appears to have been a fact then, that the Russians were at that time concentrating on their missile program as an answer to their lack of emphasis on the bomber program to compare with our own. Would you have a reaction to that?

Admiral Radford. I would say that is not true. There were differences of opinion. I was the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at that time. I recall coming up before the Senate Armed Services Committee and making a presentation. There were certain members of the committee who thought that we should be doing more in certain fields. They thought the Russians were going to build more bombers. We were urged to build more. We did not think the Russians were building a big bomber fleet. It did not make sense to me, and time proved that they were not.

One of the great areas in our intelligence estimates--no matter what country--must be based on an estimate of what the maximum capability of a country in a certain area is. In other words, in this area of bombers, we would get one estimate saying if the Russians wanted to do so, they have the capability of building a certain number of bombers or missiles a year. Whether they are actually going to build that many bombers or missiles a year is something else. That is an entirely different thing. There you are trying to read their minds.

In the case of the bombers, I didn't think they were going to go all out on this new type of bomber. I thought they were going to have a steady building program.

In the case of missiles, I don't think they are going ahead and build thousands of missiles, because they know as well as we do that in the missile field today changes are liable to come very, very rapidly. You may build a thousand missiles and then come up with a new development of a new propellant or a new guidance system that will make all your thousand look pretty much like antiques. You could say they are still going to be good but that is not always true. The Atlas missile is a missile that can't be kept ready all the time. When we get another missile that can be kept ready so that a button pushed in Washington could fire them all over the United States, then all the Atlases will go out the window.

The Russians are up against the same proposition. With them maybe it is not a question of budgetary considerations because they may not worry about those things, but it is a problem of allocation of resources: how much skilled

Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP91-00965R000300100022-3

labor they put into this particular program, how much scarce material they must allocate to it, and how many of their facilities they tie up. They have to decide whether they can afford to do a program of a certain size that way. Most of the time their production programs are pretty reasonable from that standpoint.

Senator Muskie. We seem to be running into another committee hearing, so I am going to limit myself to just two or three questions or statements I would like to get your reaction to.

It would be inaccurate, from what I understand you have to say, to describe the National Security Council, standing alone, as the nation's security watchdog. This is a role that is performed really by other agencies in our policy-making machinery.

Admiral Radford. I would say so, yes.

Senator Muskie. In terms of the NSC's function, that of developing policy, there is this statement in an article by Hans Morgenthau, and I am going to refer to two of them for the purpose of getting your reaction. He says this:

"The system has enabled the NSC to handle the continuation and development of established policies with a considerable measure of success. But the committee system has failed--and was bound to fail--in the vital task of initiating new policies and resolving major conflicts of views and interests among agencies represented on the Council."

That is on page 161, Admiral, of the committee print entitled "Selected Materials."

Admiral Radford. What committee system is he referring to?

Senator Muskie. He is referring to NSC here. He thinks of the NSC as a committee system or part of the committee system for framing policy or for developing policy. He does not think it works. Let me refer you to the other statement.

Admiral Radford. Who is writing this?

Senator Muskie. This is Hans J. Morgenthau, who was a former consultant to the State Department and is now a professor of political science at the University of Chicago.

Admiral Radford. I would disagree with him very strongly. I sat in the NSC for four years and nobody ever instructed me. I could be just as free as I wanted to be when any new question came up.

Senator Muskie. Let me refer you to what I think is the nub of his criticism and his reasoning behind that. It is on page 163.

"The problem lies in the congenital inability of the NSC to present the President with an overall view of the issue and sharply defined alternative policies, since the NSC is not an independent agency with an independent outlook, but only the sum total of the views and interests of the agencies represented on

-21-

it. It cannot cure the disease of fragmentation and parochialism, but institutionalizes it on the highest level. The President, deprived of independent sources of information and judgment, is thereby reduced to one of three roles, all inadequate: (1) arbiter of interagency conflict, (2) ratifier of compromise or the exhortative formula, (3) abstentionist who will return the issue to the agencies concerned in the hope that they will finally agree upon a formula which he can ratify."

Admiral Radford. I don't know. I would feel that this man was never close to the NSC himself. The disagreements if they come are usually over very important questions and very sharply defined.

Senator Muskie. Do they actually rise to the level where they are discussed in the presence of the President?

Admiral Radford. Yes. Maybe outside the NSC. He may also discuss them with the individuals most concerned. A great many of these questions may be differences of opinion between State and Defense. They don't have to be saved for the Security Council discussion. They may be discussed before the Security Council. They may also be discussed in the President's office, or something like that.

Senator Muskie. It has been suggested as policy ideas rise from the operational agencies and go through the organization of the National Security Council and the Planning Board, that the sharp edges of these disagreements are rubbed off in compromises that are implicit in any recommendation.

Admiral Radford. There is always a tendency in our form of government to accommodate differences of opinion. That is the way we get, along in this country in so many instances. I don't think there are as many instances of very bright new ideas getting suffocated on the way up as this would seem to indicate.

Senator Muskie. Did you find in your experience on NSC that the Planning Board presented to the Council alternatives or a well rounded agreed upon recommendation in any particular policy area?

Admiral Radford. As a matter of fact, they do come up with split papers. The splits are laid out. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have an officer on the planning board, and he kept me as Chairman informed of the discussions he was engaged in. He would report to me what was happening, what did I think about this, or what did the Chiefs think. We might have to have a meeting of the Chiefs. He might ask for instructions under certain circumstances. I was kept informed of the progress of an important paper. I think the Planning Board had a couple of meetings a week, and I might not have a discussion with him more than once a month; a lot of it he didn't have to bring to me. It is all very well to criticize what we are doing, but when it comes down to what Mr. Morgenthau would do to change it if he could, you would find out that following his reasoning to a logical conclusion, the only alternative is to get one man to make all the decisions. That is wonderful if you can find him, and if you will all agree with him when he makes the decision. These policy questions that we have to face, and other decisions, are certainly enormous and far-reaching decisions. They may involve the security of the country ten years from now.

Senator Muskie. You are satisfied that the NSC itself does not consider questions of this import?

Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP91-00965R000300100022-3

Admiral Radford. Sure, they can't escape it.

Senator Muskie. Let me ask you this, Admiral. You made the statement earlier that military programs are being constantly reviewed. I am sure they are. I was curious as to what part the NSC plays in this review.

Admiral Radford. I would say that the NSC independently cannot do much more than listen to the new program. They have no machinery to review the Department of Defense planning, for example. They can't duplicate it, nor can they duplicate the State Department planning organization. A lot they have to accept. I suppose somebody in the NSC could sit in there and say, "I don't think we need this many bomber squadrons," but somebody else would say, "What do you know about it?"

Senator Muskie. Let me ask you this. If there happens to be a difference of point of view in the Department of Defense as to, for example, the missile program, the number of Atlases that we should produce, and there have been some evidences of disagreements, at least as suggested in the press, do those two points of view, if there are two or more held within the Department of Defense, get presented before the National Security Council?

Admiral Radford. Invariably they are. Remember in that particular instance, the decision has to be made by the President and not by the National Security Council.

Senator Muskie. I appreciate that. In any machinery we set up we cannot dilute the President's authority. We know that.

Admiral Radford. In a presentation of the military program before the NSC, the NSC is not asked to give its approval or disapproval as a rule. They hear it. If any member wants to say, "I think this should be changed," then he can start a conversation on the subject. But very seldom is it that they do. They hear the difficulties. They may contribute to a discussion. But the decisions on matters of grave importance of that kind are passed to the President, and may have been before a presentation is made to them. The matter may have been discussed and probably has been discussed with him previously.

Senator Muskie. In the event the NSC might prior to the hearing of this defense presentation have a consensus within itself as to the nature of a particular military threat posed by the Soviet Union, and if NSC should have developed a consensus on a policy recommendation, it ought to make to the President in this connection, and if in the judgment of members of NSC the presentation by the Defense Department appeared to suggest some programs that were inconsistent with this previously arrived upon policy, would NSC then be in a position in any way to utilize its machinery to bring to bear upon the defense program its consensus after appropriate study and review and consideration?

Admiral Radford. I find it a little bit difficult to understand exactly what you mean. The NSC is composed of a number of individuals. I can't believe that they would get together enough to discuss a question like that. In other words, they are all busy men, and they would generally accept the report of the Secretary of Defense. If they had as individuals some different ideas, they would still feel free to express them, and on occasion they have. They

-23-

would hardly have the ability or the machinery to go exhaustively into the Department of Defense background or planning machinery, and find out and understand the details of the question that they had raised. In other words, most of the individuals there would not have the capability to really, if they disagreed, go in and find out whether the Department of Defense planning had been correct.

Senator Muskie. Then what you are saying is that NSC is not in a position and does not have the resources to be creative in the field of defense policy.

Admiral Radford. Policy is something else.

Senator Muskie. In the implementation of defense policy.

Admiral Radford. Implementation of defense policy means down to nuts and bolts of what you are going to buy and what you are not going to buy, and all that. No, they do not have that machinery.

Senator Muskie. Would you complete the reaction you started to make to my first phraseology, that NSC does not have the machinery to develop defense policy?

Admiral Radford. I did not say that. Defense policy is different. Yes, they have machinery. That is what they do get into, policy planning. That is a different thing.

Senator Muskie. The point that you do make is that although their function is to develop defense policy on an advisory basis, this has to be implemented by the Department of Defense. Does the NSC perform a function in determining or evaluating whether or not the policy which they do set is being effectively implemented by the Department of Defense.

Admiral Radford. The OCB is supposed to check on that. Actually defense policy is in a category where if it is once approved, it is carried out by the Secretary of Defense.

Senator Muskie. But only the President can second guess the Department.

Admiral Radford. Yes.

Senator Muskie. The NSC does not.

Admiral Radford. No. In formulating defense policy papers, for instance, or plans, the Department of Defense representatives are in on that at all times. It may be that there are matters of interest submitted by the State Department or from the Treasury Department or from some other agency represented on this planning board that may change or influence the basic paper presented originally by the Defense Department. The Defense Department planners might agree that something very worthwhile has been added. If they don't, I mean if the planning paper comes before NSC as a paper that has very sharp differences of opinion on what should be our defense policy, then it has to be resolved by the President. He listens to the whole discussion. Then it is up to him to decide.

Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP91-00965R000300100022-3

Senator Muskie. Thank you very much, Admiral.

Admiral Radford. I hope I have helped out a little bit, but I am not sure I have.

Senator Muskie. You have clarified the picture for me in some respects.

Senator Jackson. I think the counsel for the minority has questions.

Mr. Pendleton. No questions.

Senator Jackson. As a final question, I wonder if you have any recommendations or comments regarding an improvement that might be made in the NSC process or in the area of national security policy planning as a whole. I do not ask this question in any partisan spirit that might imply that recently things have not gone as well as they should. I ask the question solely in a spirit of determining whether there is opportunity for improvement.

Admiral Radford. I actually cannot think of any constructive suggestion that I could give you in that field.

Senator Jackson. What about improvements within the Department of Defense? I realize that the problem of unification and a better organization within the Department of Defense is a continuous one. Do you have any comments since you last testified when you were Chairman of the Joint Chiefs regarding further changes in the law?

Admiral Radford. Only the one I mentioned before. I think the new reorganization plan is getting a good workout under Mr. Gates. He certainly understood the background of it. It is a little too early to tell whether it is going to do some of the things that we hoped it would do.

Senator Jackson. Admiral, we are grateful to you for your help this afternoon. We appreciate your taking time out to give us the benefit of your counsel and advice. We are most grateful to you.

Admiral Radford. Thank you. I hope I have been of some help.

(Whereupon, at 4:30 p.m. the committee was recessed subject to call.)